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1. Introduction 
The social sciences are divided, both between sub disciplines as well as within them, between adherents of 
the view that structures or institutions ‘determine’ individual behavior on the one hand, and those who 
argue that social structures or institutions are the unplanned outcome of the interplay of individual 
behavior. This structure – agency controversy continues and is a fundamental topic of debate in the social 
sciences, especially because a compromise does not seem possible. An attempt to develop a conceptual 
framework in which neither priority is given to agency or to structure seems to be a bridge too far. As a 
consequence, the literature is littered with partial explanations of how behavior of individuals shape 
institutions as well as that individual behavior is shaped by institutions. However frustrating this agency-
structure issue often seems to be, we believe that a beginning of a solution is to be found in these different 
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contributions, if only at a metatheoretical level, emphasizing the dynamic, process-driven character of 
how agency and structures interact.  
 This paper is built in two parts. The first part traces the historical roots of the issue of structure and 
agency in the problem of order (section 2) and relates how dissatisfaction with contrasting models of 
social order induced attempts at bridging divergent perspectives (section 3).  The argument that from 
such past efforts a new perspective may be (re)constructed is developed in a fourth section. In section 
five we explore this process–driven framework conceptually. The three kinds of tensions that we 
hypothesize will trigger a process of change of existing institutions are discussed in section six. A 
concluding section ensues.    
 
2. Social Order and Social Change: an intellectual history 
The tension between (social) order and change, or, alternatively formulated, between structure and 
agency, has a long history in the social sciences. Time and again periods of change, uncertainty and 
conflict have induced questions on order and cohesion, the so-called problem of order. The problem of 
order poses the question: how is social order possible? Why are conflict and chaos not the rule? This 
question suggested itself in the seventeenth century when the existing order lost its self-evidence as 
traditional conceptions of order as resulting from natural forces or as being God-given increasingly 
became less convincing (Hirschman, 1977).  
The problem of order received its classic expression from the English philosopher Thomas 
Hobbes (1588-1679). Deeply concerned with the religious and civil wars which afflicted the society of 
his day, Hobbes attempted to provide a system of thought which spelled out the indisputable rules of 
civil society through which the appetites and aversions of men were directed towards order and peace. 
Taking as his points of departure man’s egoistic inclinations in the fearsome pursuit of his insatiable 
desires and the idea that those desires increasingly converge (scarcity) in the struggle for eminence, 
Hobbes concluded that conflicts of interest would naturally arise in the competition for scarce means 
to gratify men’s desires. Life in such a state of nature, as a consequence, would be “solitary, poore, 
nasty, brutish and short” (Hobbes, 1985:186). The ubiquitous threat and fear could only be overcome, 
enabling peaceful coexistence, Hobbes posited, if men enter into an agreement to transfer their rights 
and power to a sovereign or Leviathan who ensures “That men performe their Convenants made” 
(1985:201) to curtail the pursuit of self-interest. With the image of society as a social contract or 
covenant, Hobbes tried to show his contemporaries the rationality and utility of such a covenant in 
terms of peace and material progress and to warn of the disastrous consequences of a ‘breach of 
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contract’.  Hobbes’s solution to the problem of order hinges upon the assumption of man’s selfish 
inclinations that needs to be curbed by the sovereign’s exercise of power. 
The Enlightenment inspired a new problem definition of the problem of order as man’s 
sociability was emphasized, inviting a reevaluation of self-interest. Why would individual interests 
necessarily conflict? People’s needs and interests may coincide, and one stands to gain from 
cooperation. Especially Scottish moral philosophers turned such newly gained insights into an 
alternative solution to the problem of order; a solution featuring the regulating effect of the market on 
individuals’ behavior. Hobbes’s view of society as an artificial construction by way of a covenant is 
replaced by an interpretation of society as a network of relationships of exchange between mutually 
dependent individuals. Efforts to maintain mutual profitable relations of exchange give rise to rules, 
which increasingly attain the status of generalized rules of morality and justice, embodied in the 
institutional structure of society. In an ongoing process of adjustment of behavior, interests and moral 
rules within impersonal relations of mutual dependence, individual interests unintentionally are 
harmonized with the general interest and order is tentatively and unintentionally brought about. 
Suggesting that order in a market society has a natural and spontaneous rather than an artificial and 
enforced character, Adam Smith (1981;1982) made a plea for the benign ‘invisible hand’ of market 
forces as against the coercive, visible hand of the lawgiver.    
 
Taking an organistic perspective on society, Auguste Comte (1798-1857), founding-father of 
sociology, did not expect much from a coerced or spontaneous concurrence of individual sentiments 
and interests: “No concurrence of interests, or even sympathy in sentiments, can give durability to the 
smallest society if there be not intellectual unanimity enough to obviate or correct such discordance as 
must inevitably arise” (Comte, in Lenzer, 1975:288). Without unity of thought and a consensus about 
values and norms in society deriving from such unity, order is a precarious thing. The chaotic times of 
post-revolutionary France inspired Comte to call for a reconstruction of society to allow such 
cognitive unity to take shape. He proposed a systematic, positivistic method of acquiring the 
knowledge required,to be synthesized in a new science: sociology. Adopting such a method, the 
invariable laws which govern order and progress would yield their secrets. Science would enable man 
to gain insight into the development of order as a necessary process. Comte conceived society as a 
organic whole in which the parts are given their appropriate meaning and contents within functional 
relationships which exists among them (order) and which evolves within a natural process of growth 
(progress). Even though society is the result of the associations of individuals, it represents a specific 
reality which has its own characteristics and laws. Society is not a construction of individuals but 
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rather the individual is a construction of society. Thus the necessary consensus and cohesion to achieve 
order and progress could be affected as soon as man’s knowledge, sentiments and interests are suited 
to the requirements of society.   
 Similar views were advanced by Durkheim (and later by Parsons), claiming that in industrial 
societies the necessity of a coherence of specialized functions to the conservation of society produces a 
consensus, which states the conditions of conservation in terms of values and norms, and which 
induces individuals to attune their interests to the common interest. 
 
As these approaches of order took shape, it became clear that such differences in the relative 
importance of the constituent elements of order, viz. power, interest and values, were not their only 
distinguishing features. Another such feature concerns the question of the nature of reality. On the one 
hand it is argued that social phenomena are to be understood as the result of individual actions 
oriented towards the (expected) actions of others. This agency point of view is handsomely captured 
by Elster, when he claimed that “there are no societies, only individuals who interact with each other” 
(1989:248). Adherents of the structural approach, on the other hand, emphasize that society is a reality 
sui generis. Individual behavior, interdependent and interwoven with behavior of others, unintentially 
gives rise to structured regularities in processes, relatively autonomous with regard to the intentions 
and preferences of individuals. As Durkheim expressed this point of view: “La première règle et la 
plus fondamentale est de considérer les faits sociaux comme des choses” (Durkheim, Les Règles 
(1895), 1947:15).  
 The structure – agency issue, which has developed from the problem of order, concerns the tension 
between these competing views on social reality. Closely linked to this issue, however, albeit not 
necessarily the same, is the question of how to study social phenomena. Two contrasting methodological 
views may be distinguished. Methodological individualism assumes that any explanation of social facts is 
to be rooted at the level of the individual, i.e. an explanation is to be build from the (given) preferences, 
expectations and motives or behavior of rationally acting individuals. Adherents of methodological 
collectivism object that social phenomena cannot be reduced to the properties of the individual parts but 
ought to be studied within the social system in which they occur.  
 
In the course of time, these contrasting views on the constituent element of order as well as on the relation 
between agency and structure have been elaborated and formalized within several theoretical perspectives.  
Inspired by Durkheim, the dominant paradigm in sociology until the 1960s was structural functionalism 
(Parsons; 1951, 1968). In this methodological collectivistic approach, society is taken as an organic whole 
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of interdependent, functional parts, each contributing to the maintenance and integration of society. 
Stability and cohesion, based on a consensus on values and norms, in which individuals are socialized 
through institutional arrangements, are taken as characteristic of the normal condition of the social system. 
Reasoning from the perspective of the social system, Parsons (1951, 1951) thus argued that human 
actions are embedded in an institutional system and therefore follow patterns in accordance with norms, 
directed at the preservation of that order. Social order may be said to be secured to the extent that those 
actions are institutionalized, that is, sanctioned by the social system and internalized by individuals. This 
institutionalized system of norms is an expression of the consensus about what is just, good and desirable 
(values). Ultimately in Parsons’ conception, it is the common value-system, the normative structure of 
society that makes social order possible.  
 The consensus model has been criticized for assuming a common framework of shared values and 
norms and its ‘oversocialized concept of man’, in the words of Wrong. Such an approach ignores the 
fact that society gives evidence of instability, disintegration, dysfunctionality and conflict. Following 
Marx and Weber, Dahrendorf proposed a conflict- or coercion model of society as a complement to 
the consensus model. In this model, order is seen as a precarious equilibrium of relations of power 
between status groups: “it is not voluntary cooperation or general consensus but enforced constraint 
that makes social organizations cohere” (1959: 165). Searle (1994) talks about ‘institutional facts’ in 
this regard. 
 Next to these macrosociological approaches, an individualistic tradition can be distinguished in 
sociology. In this tradition the exchange or coalition model holds central stage, in which social 
phenomena are traced to individual behavior and strategies. Society is seen as a network of exchange 
relations between individuals, bent upon their rational self-interest, displaying a certain regularity and 
stability resulting from recurrent interactions. “Institutions do not keep going just because they are 
enshrined in norms, (..) They keep going because they have pay-offs, ultimately pay-offs for individuals” 
(Homans, 1961:366). 
 
In summary, the following differences in views on order can be discerned:  
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Table 1: Models of Social Order 
 Model of social 
order 
Order 
generating 
institution 
Primary bond of 
social order 
Source of rules 
Hobbes conflict state political power 
Smith cooperation market socio-economic interests 
Comte /  
Durkheim
  
consensus Society / 
community 
cognitive  Values / norms 
 
 
3. Between agency and structure: some current thinking  
Each of the models we distinguished in the previous section pursues a different perspective on how 
agents come to act in a coordinated way. However appealing these models are, the fact remains that 
each model presents an one-sided image of society by emphasizing only one of the constituent 
elements of order. As Cohen remarked: “All social order rests on a combination of coercion, interest and 
values” (1968:32; italics added).  Basically we are still facing the question how structure and agency 
interact. In the recent past several authors, working within different scientific disciplines, have 
contributed to the debate on how to conceptualize such concerted play of structure and agency. In this 
section we will pass in revue some of these contributions in order to take measure of the debate.  
 
In The Moral Dimension: Towards a New Economics (1988), Etzioni contrasts the rationalistic-
individualistic, neo-classical paradigm with the social-conservative view, which argues the need for a 
strong authority to control the often irrational impulses of men to maintain order. “Out of the dialogue 
between these two paradigms, a third position arises … It sees individuals as able to act rationally and on 
their own, advancing their self or ‘I’, but their ability to do so is deeply affected by how well they are 
anchored within a sound community … a community they perceive as theirs, as a ‘We’ rather than an 
imposed restraining ‘they’” (1988: ix-x). Such a third position, Etzioni argues, implies the need to revise 
the core-assumptions of neo-classical economics: next to self-interest as the motivational spring of 
human action, it should be acknowledged that individuals seek to abide by the moral commitments that 
are shaped within the community to which they belong. Thus he attempts to develop a broader 
paradigm, which on the one hand encompasses the neo-classical paradigm and on the other recognizes 
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morality on an equal plane as utility as a source of valuation and motivation in economic behaviour. 
At the core of this so-called I & We paradigm is “the assumption of creative tension and perpetual 
search for balance between two primary forces - those of individuals and those of the community, of 
which they are members” (1988: 8).  
According to Etzioni, man is first and foremost a social being whose wants and choices are 
influenced by values, emotions and habits that are formed within the community rather than by 
conscious, rational deliberation, inspired by self-interest. Given the assumption of the pivotal role of 
social collectivities, in which interactions are enveloped by moral commitments as well as influenced 
by the relative power of the different economic and political agents, he contends that to a large extent 
decision-making and deliberation may be explained with reference to the collectively set contexts 
(institutions and organizations) within which individuals operate. In this sense the market is neither 
free-standing nor self-perpetuating, but encompassed within ‘the societal capsule’. Within this capsule, 
the rules of the game are formed and changed (institutionalization) to mitigate the tension between 
interest and moral commitment, or in more general terms, between market and community.  
 
If Etzioni may be said to arrive at a notion of institutionalization, like Durkheim, from the point of 
view of collectivities, Granovetter builds his argument, as did Weber, from the agency point of view, 
emphasizing that (economic) action should be analysed as being submerged in ongoing social relations. 
Granovetter objects to the view that rational, self-interested behavior is only marginally affected by 
social relations. “Actors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social context, nor do they adhere 
slavishly to a script written for them … Their attempts at purposive action are instead embedded in 
concrete, ongoing systems of social relations” (1985:487). Pursuing a middle position, Granovetter 
develops his embeddedness argument: economic action influences and is affected by (structures of) 
social relations. He argues that economic action and the way it is structured should be seen in the context 
of developing social relations or institutionalization. He emphasizes that on the one hand the extent and 
nature of social relations between agents may explain the specific forms of institutional arrangements 
between markets and hierarchies that arise. These relations are often of a personal nature, for which 
reason Granovetter speaks of personal embeddedness. On the other hand, once such arrangements exert a 
structuring influence on economic action and the interpretation that are attached to them (structural 
embeddedness), they are bound to affect social relations.     
 According to Granovetter, institutionalization is both a matter of social construction by individuals in 
face to face interactions as well as a process in which behavior increasingly becomes embedded and 
structured within larger networks to which actors belong. “Institutions that arise and stabilize begin as 
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accretions of activity patterns around personal networks. Their structure reflects that of the networks, and 
even when those networks are no longer in place, the institutions take on a life of their own that limits 
the forms future institutional development can take” (1990: 105). 
 
Criticizing theories which either take the individual/agent or society/structure as its point of departure, 
Giddens developed his theory of structuration to overcome the shortcomings of both these polar views. 
“The basic domain of the study of the social sciences, according to the theory of structuration, is 
neither the experience of the individual actor, nor the existence of any form of social totality, but 
social practices ordered across time and space” (Giddens, 1984:2). Central to structuration theory is 
the concept of ‘duality of structure’ or the notion that agency and structure are to be considered as 
inextrically interwoven. “The constitution of agents and structures are not two independently given 
sets of phenomena, a dualism, but represent a duality … the structural properties of social systems are 
both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organize,” (1984: 25, 26). Structure, rules, 
resources and roles only exists in the day to day routines of people (Jackson, 2005), while interaction 
between agents is framed by the rules and resources that make up structures. According to Giddens, it 
are recurrent social practices where individual and society meet and in which both are constituted.   
 
  Proposition 1: Individuals, being social animals off necessity, cannot escape institutions. 
 
Even when one acknowledges that individuals cannot escape institutions, it is possible to (1) make choices 
within any given institutional setting, as well as (2) shape institutions in one’s environment. The former 
we interpret as the range for choices open to individuals within a given institutional setting, and would 
thus indicate the extent to which the ‘script’ of such a setting is closed or open (compare Akrich 1992, 
Gioia & Poole 1984). The latter is particularly of import from a theoretical perspective, and is addressed 
to some degree by the literature on ‘institutional entrepreneurship’ (DiMaggio 1991). The latter is 
particularly acute when one no longer assumes that institutions unequivocally prescribe appropriate 
behavior. If one, as we do, assumes that institutional settings can always be understood in different ways, 
differing perceptions between any two people can exist that may impact institutional change. 
 
  Proposition 2 Institutions never have a script so closed that an agent needs no  
    interpretation to act upon them – all institutions allow for multiple  
    interpretations. 
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Yet another contribution is to be found in Wrong’s ‘The Problem of Order: what unites and what divides 
society?’ (1994). In his book Wrong emphasizes the dual nature of expectations. From their need for 
social approval and/or order and the absence of conflict individuals develop expectations about one 
another’s behavior, which become ‘self-fulfilling prophecies’. Thus social interactions assume a repetitive 
and predictable character. The fact that individuals mutually are conscious of one another’s expectations 
gives such expectations a normative character at the same time, which translates itself in norms and 
institutions. From Wrong’s perspective, “[s]ociety is both the web that is spun and the expectations out of 
which it is spun” (1994:45). Groups, institutions and societies are to be seen as concentrations of repetitive 
interactions between individuals, creating both regularities and norms.   
 Archer has claimed that “the problem of structure and agency has rightly come to be seen as the 
basic issue in modern social theory” (1988: xi). Even if in current times different views on the issue 
remain visible (Touraine 1977, Bourdieu 1977, 1984, Habermas 1984, 1987, Burns 1986, Archer 
1988, Wrong 1994): many of the arguments made are recognizable from earlier discussions, though 
the terms used may have changed. These persistent differences concern, for instance, the nature of the 
agent (individual actor or collectivities and organizations), the meaning of structure, and the 
theoretical perspectives used to address the agency-structure linkage (Ritzer, 1992: 588-9). We argue 
that these classical authors help in diagnosing the gap between approaches that emphasize the structure 
or the agency side of the discussion. Structure and agency, or collectivism and individualism, have 
often been taken to be categorical opposites. The opposition is by no means universally accepted and 
certainly not in the history of the concept (Lukes 1971), which is supported by recent empirical 
research (e.g., Allik & Realo 2004).  
 
4. Relating Structure & Agency: the process of institutional change 
These various contributions are important to our understanding of social phenomena in emphasizing that a 
focus on (the process of) institutionalisation may avoid a polarity between structure and agency. Looking 
beyond the details of the divergent solutions, we suggest, there is almost unimanity on the direction in 
which a solution is to be sought. At a metatheoretical level these various contributions tend to 
emphasize that structures and agency are conceptually linked in the process by which 
institutionalization takes place. Such an emphasis allows for a third point of view, the process itself, 
distinct from both the perspective of the agents as well as of structure. It is a view that is very much 
reminiscent of Adam Smith’s impartial spectator. 
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“Before we make any proper comparison of those opposite interests [our own and the spectator’s], we must change our 
position. We must view them, neither from our own place nor yet from his, neither with our own eyes nor yet with his, 
but from the place and with the eyes of a third person, who has no particular connection with either, and who jusdges 
with impartiality between us” (Smith, TMS, III.3.3). 
 
Some of the basic materials from which such a third perspective can be build are to be found in the work 
of Durkheim and Weber. Developing a structural (collectivistic) approach, Durkheim asserted that 
from the perspective of the individual, society represents an independent objective reality (chose or 
‘thing’) which conditions and controls behavior (cf. Beckert 2002). Even though social facts are 
produced by individuals, sociology focuses on the objective form that social facts assume in society: 
institutions or collective ways of acting and thinking. In contrast, Weber (1964) adopted an agency or 
individualistic perspective, arguing that “social reality consists of subjectively experienced meaning 
rather than objectively existing systems and structures” (Zijderveld, 1970:41). In Weber’s view, 
sociology is about meaningful action and hence individual action as only individuals can give meaning 
to action. Rather than objective social facts, institutions are to be seen as social frameworks conveying 
chances for meaningful behavior. 
 Instead of stressing institutions or individual agents – a focus on institutionalization may circumvent 
the analytical reduction of the one to the other, allowing a more realistic view of reality. Durkheim 
views sociology as the theory of social institutions, claiming that an objective description of reality can be 
given, while Weber views sociology as the theory of social action, providing a subjective description of 
reality. The two views complement one another. Institutionalization can be seen as the process of 
objectification of subjectively interpreted actions of actors into stable, more or less normative, patterns of 
behavior. Both perspectives on social reality are linked, as it were (Zijderveld, 1974: 30). If the process of 
institutionalization may be represented as a continuum between (subjectively interpreted actions of) actors 
and (congealed patterns of action or) institutions, Weber and Durkheim may be said to have reasoned 
from opposite sides of the continuum – their thinking cannot be classified as representative of the 
extremes. Weber emphasized that in the process of institutionalization the subjective meaning that 
individuals attach to action becomes objectificated and behavioral norms and sanctions emerge through 
which action may be rationalized and legitimized. Durkheim, on the other hand, stressed the consequences 
for social action of congealed, habitual behavioral patterns or institutions. As an objective reality, on 
which the individual has no influence, institutions exercise a regulating influence on human action.  
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Figure 1: The agency – institutions continuum 
    More or less instittutionalized patterns of action 
 
Subjectively        Congealed 
interpreted   Process of objectification  patterns of action,  
 
actions    Process of collectivization  or institutions 
 
   Accompanying interpretations, rationalisations and legitimations 
 
Figure 1 indicates how patterns of action become ‘objectificated’, solidified, congealed, or 
institutionalized as situations at concrete moments, but that at the same time, individuals will have an 
understanding or ‘definition’ of the situation in mind that will actually bring her to concrete action in a 
particular situation. According to Thomas (1951) behavior is determined not only by the situation that 
may be described in objective terms, but also by the definition of the situation or the subjective 
interpretation of that situation by the individual. Institutions are frameworks of routinized patterns of 
behavior and interpretation, influencing/pre-determining the situation as well as to some extent the 
definition that individuals have in mind. Without a shared definition of the situation, no (complex 
patterns of) interaction is possible (Boulding 1956). As Kenneth Boulding argues, talking about 
‘image’ as ‘what I hold to be true’ in a factual and a moral interpretation of the term true (“fact and 
value” (Boulding 1956, p.11): 
 
  “It is this image that largely governs my behavior” (Boulding, 1956, p.16) 
  “Part of our image of the world is the believe that this image is shared by other people like  
  ourselves who are also part of our image of the world” (ibib., p.14) 
 
 At the same time the individual, in reacting to the situation and its definition, influences these 
institutional frames. According to Thomas’ theorem, named after the American sociologist: “If men 
define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (Thomas, 1932:572). The first part of the 
theorem, including the element of chance it brings out, refers to Weber’s notion of (subjective or inter-
subjective) meaning, while the second part with Durkheim emphasizes the objectified results of 
institutionalization. The process of institutionalization and institutional change, thus, emphasizes 
interaction between actions and institutions, and includes a structural as well as a cultural dimension.  
 time
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5. The process of institutional change 
We submit that an understanding of the process of institutional change may arise from an explanation 
of what triggers processes of institutional change, relating structure and agency. Institutions are 
routinized patterns of behavior to solve collective and recurrent social problems that have normative 
overtones. This tentative definition of institution (for an elaboration see appendix A) implies: (1) that 
institutional patterns are likely to change if the nature or extent of social problems change (e.g. due to 
demographic or technological changes), and (2) that institutions imply reference to values, given that 
they require legitimacy of some kind, to some extent (Scot 1994). After all, a pattern is ‘imposed’ 
upon the individual as behavior that is expected of him. The expectations must have legitimacy in the 
eye of a community, and individuals themselves need to be able to expalin or justify their own 
behavior as well. Besides asking the question of how people behave in the way that they behave, we 
need to address the question of why they do so (Ullmann-Margalit 1978). Being reflexive, people’s 
perception of their own behavior is implicated in how they behave.3 
 
  Proposition 3: Institutions need to be seen as legitimate by agents to act on them. 
 
The why-issue is an essential element of any theory of institutional change, and thus we submit the 
Social Value Nexus (Figure 3) as a way to understand processes of institutional change. Institutions 
emerge or are set up with reference to socio-cultural values which give them their legitimacy and 
ensure that they are adhered to by individuals. As Rockeach (1979, p.50) observed “[socio-cultural] 
values are socially shared cognitive representations of institutional goals and demands”. Socially shared 
conceptions of ‘the desirable’ are learned by individuals who are subject to the external and internal 
‘forces’ of socialization on the one hand, and imitation, or the urge to belong to a particular group of 
people on the other (Rockeach 1979, p.48).  
 In everyday life people recognize that socio-cultural values play a critical role, in economic 
processes as well as in society at large. When people want to make sense of what happens in their 
surroundings, or want to understand why others do certain things, or even to make decisions 
themselves about what they should do, they invoke what might be called (socio-cultural) ‘values’ 
(Hofstede 1980, Inglehart 1990, and Kluckhohn 1962). The economic theorist Frank Knight (1982) 
readily acknowledged the importance of what he has called ‘value deliberation’ in understanding 
                                                           
3 Cf. Carrithers (1990), Dunbar (1998), Givón (2005). The human brain seems particularly attuned to complex social 
behaviour, especially using language to understand and express higher-order intensions. 
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human behavior. Arguments for an alternative arrangement convince people only if what is seen as the 
proper socio-cultural values are aluded too, even if the alternative directly hurts a particular 
individual’s or organization’s interests. A practice constituted of institutions that does not appear to 
relate socio-cultural values will be perceived as empty and may soon be abandoned.  
 
  Figure 3: The Social Value Nexus redux 
Socio-cultural values (VALUES) 
 
Institutional Setting / Institutions 
 
Valuations 
Source: Dolfsma (2004) 
 
There is considerable confusion concerning the term ‘value.’ Value is a central notion in ethics; 
economists equate it with ‘price,’ and some other scientists think of normative science when the word 
‘value’ is used. A distinction between socio-cultural values (or VALUES) on the one hand, and 
valuations, on the other, seems necessary given the widespread confusion. For us, Socio-cultural 
values denote strong underlying convictions many people in a group or in society hold, consciously as 
well as unconsciously, most of which would be considered of an ethical, cultural, or philosophical 
nature. These include matters of justice, beauty, love, freedom of will, autonomy, rightful ways of 
government and governance, social standing and behavior, and personal identity. The socio-cultural 
values that ‘live’ in a society or community, and are expressed in its institutional settings, may change 
over time (Inglehart 1990), but are likely to be persistent (Hofstede 1980, Campbell 1987). The socio-
cultural values as shared in a community point to the kind of things that one can (is socially allowed to) 
aspire to; they point to the kind of things that are preferably pursued and the direction in which society in 
general moves (Kluckhohn 1951). In Appendix A we elaborate on the definition of institutions, and 
discuss how institutions are irrevocably interrelated. 
 The distinction between socio-cultural values on the one hand and valuations on the other is rooted 
in institutional (economic) theory and (economic) sociology. Durkheim, Weber, and Parsons, for 
instance, argued that norms, ideals and ultimate ends should be considered if a social scientist is to 
understand society and the economy (cf. Beckert 2002, Davis 2003, Bush 1987, Neale 1987). The 
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cultural theorist Wildavsky (1987) showed how people’s voting behavior, their preferences for 
politicians or political points of view, depend on the institutional setting, reflecting underlying socio-
cultural values. Figure 3 graphically presents the argument in this section that valuation, aspirations, 
and behavior need to be understood as institutionalized expressions of underlying socio-cultural 
values. 
 
We have departed, conceptually, from an emphasis on values and norms as it is much neglected in the 
recent history of ideas. Such a starting point emphasizes the need for institutions to be shared in a 
group; it stresses, drawing on Durkheim, the need for some consensus to exist. An additional feature 
of this starting point is that it suggests the conceptual distinction within the idea of structure between 
Institutions (norms) and Values, which, as we develop below, is one way for agency to exert itself. 
Nevertheless, as became apparent from our discussion of the models of social order, it is one-sided, in 
need of the assistence of the other perspectives. Does the perspective from which we depart allow for a 
conceptual link with the other two views presented in Table 1? According to Dahl (1957, p.202-3) “A 
has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do”. It is 
crucial to understand, however, that power can only be exerted to the extent and in the manner that is 
perceived as legitimate within the institutional setting at hand (Dahl 1957). The means, domain, 
amount and scope of power depend on the institutional context: that context may allow for brute use of 
overwhelming power, but it may also have to rely on persuasion. Persuasion, getting B to do 
something he would initially not do, may be conceived as power as well (Lukes 1979). The instances 
where communication between different agents is governed by Habermassian Sprachethik may be few 
(cf. Habermas 1984, 1987). Power, however subtly used, will need to be legitimated, at least when 
initially instituted, nonetheless. 
 Interests that people act upon, similarly, do not exist in a social and institutional vacuum. Rather, 
institutions determine the setting in which agents establish what behavior is, rationally, in their best 
interest, and whether or not this is the kind of behavior that they wish to undertake (Wildavsky 1987). 
Rationality is (geographically and historically, thus institutionally) situated rather than essentialist, 
reflecting or emanating from a Platonic or Archimedean ideal (Gibson 1977). Even when assuming 
that an agent’s preferences or wishes are fixed, one would assume that they have developed in specific 
circumstances (Grafstein 1990; see also Geertz 1973).4  
                                                           
4 Cf. Hirschman (1977) who tracks the changes in the meaning and significance of the concept of ‘(self) 
interest’ itself, as well as the contexts in which it was used. 
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 Such a combined perspective – featuring values, power and interests – is important because it 
allows us to understand how normative patterns of behavior develop into organizational structures. 
The concrete institutions or institutional setting that develops depends upon the balance of power and 
interests and the nature and strength of underlying socio-cultural values. Note that a distinction is 
introduced between practice on the one hand, and institutions/institutional setting on the other hand. 
Practice refers to a generally recognized area a community or society deems some sort of order should 
be created for. Concrete institutions or a particular institutional setting would then be providing that 
order. Instantiations at particular moments in time of institutions shaping people’s valuations, and 
aspirations create the ‘situations’ as defined by individuals. Agency may show in (1) opting for an 
institutional setting, in (2) interpreting and seeking the acceptable boundaries for behavior within an 
existing institutional setting, in (3) erecting a alternative institutional setting for a given practice.  
 
 Proposition 4: Most pertinently, however, agency may show in (4) changing an  
    existing institutional setting. 
 
Next to socio-cultural values we also distinguished valuations. Valuations are the terms of trade / 
exchange established in society for specific goods or services. As a valuation is acted upon and agents 
behave, in a situation as perceived and defined by the agent, it might be expressed as a price but need 
not (Bush 2007; Zelizer 1985, 1979, 1997; Tool 1991). The way in which valuations are expressed 
differs between different institutional settings where different socio-cultural values are expressed. 
Valuations, including people’s aspirations and preferences, takes place in situations that are 
instantiations of what institutional settings ‘prescribe’. It is in relation to the particular institutions that 
agents behave. This distinction between socio-cultural values and valuations is possibly not 
exhaustive. This discussion suggests additions to the model (see figure 4). 
 Many scholars have contributed from various perspectives and disciplines on the theory of 
institutional change. Literature in institutional theory is now proliferating. It would appear, however, that 
up to date, the antecedents of and goals for, rather than the process of institutional change have been 
emphasized. We surmise that analyzing processes of institutional change necessitates an understanding 
of individuals as agents who interpret and perceive their situation, consisting of institutions, forming 
valuations (aspirations, preferences) that they act on. Agents can challenge the institutional setting they 
face by opting out. Less radical options for agents are to construct a rival institutional setting for the 
same purposes, or to change the existing institutional setting. Implicitly or explicitly, the perception of a 
tension between an institutional setting and the socio-cultural values it refers to and builds on starts such 
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a process (cf. Wildavsky 1987). In order not to become an outcast of society in general, any agent will 
need to act in situations that are recognizable due to the institution that give it their meanings. 
Emphasizing interpretation and perception implies an understanding of knowledge that does not equate it 
to accumulated pieces of information, the Bayesian view of knowledge and knowledge acquisition. 
Insights from the field of (social) psychology and, within sociology, symbolic interactionism 
particularly, are implicitly drawn on (Berger and Luckmann 1966, Bandura 1986; see Dolfsma 2004). 
Returning to Boulding, a definition of the situation, or more generally as Boulding uses the term, an 
image is not necessarily held consciously by every individual in a community. In interactions with 
others:  
 
  “Each person has an image not only of his own role but of a great many roles around him. These  
  images are constantly being changed by the messages received.” (Boulding 1956, p.105) 
 
 
  Figure 4: The Social Value Nexus 
Socio-cultural values (VALUES) 
 
Institutional Settings / Institutions 
Behaviors                                                                                                     (Definitions of)  
(including speech)                                                                                         Situations 
 
Valuations 
(aspirations, preferences) 
 
 
The framework presented in the figure above shows that it is not deterministic. Socio-cultural values 
do not determine exactly which institutions emerge; lines instead of arrows connect the concepts. 
Change can and does go in both directions. The relation between institutions and socio-cultural values 
may become undone. The perception of legitimacy of existing institutions may disappear, something 
which individuals may note and act upon, for instance to instigate institutional changes. Many have 
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contributed to the theory of institutional change, although not all of these would acknowledge the role 
socio-cultural values play (Scott 1995, Hodgson 1993, North 1990, Boulding 1956). Whether or not 
scholars from a particular theoretical paradigm do or do not acknowledge the role of socio-cultural 
values is partly related to their view of how to conceptualize the individual (cf. Davis 2003). 
 
Having explained the process elements of practices and valuations, we next need to introduce the 
elements of performance and behavior to complete our representation of the process of institutional 
change, as presented in figure 4. Our focus on the process of institutional change allows for a role for 
agency not just to exploit the ‘zone of tolerance’ (Hamilton) that existing institutions offer, but also to 
seek for instance to alter existing institutions. Based on their set of values and norms, people have 
expectations about the performance of organizational structures or practices. Such performance is the 
material outcome of the ways values, power and interests are translated into practices and presents the 
extent to which these values and interests are served successfully, with an framework of interpretation 
rationalizing and legitimizing these outcomes. Individual valuations, however, may of course diverge 
from judgements following from this framework, and depending upon the constellation of values, 
power and interests, induce changes of behavior.     
 We submit that the above framework of the process of institutional change not only allow us 
to indicate when institutional change is most likely to occur, but also which direction institutional 
change is likely to take. Some changes are more likely than others, however. Small, incremental 
changes in an institutional setting can, for instance, result in a tension in the relation between socio-
cultural values and institutions. Such a tension could set in motion a process wherein a community’s 
socio-cultural values change. In most cases, however, the institutions are more likely to change. Below 
we will elaborate on this point by developing the concept of ‘tension’. 
 
6. The triggers of the process of institutional change: tensions 
In this paper we focus on the process of institutional change. This implies that we leave aside the case 
that individuals exercise their agency by creating a new institutional practice and concomitant definition 
of the situation by reference to its institutional setting and the relevant underlying socio-cultural values. 
Our discussion draws on the Social Value Nexus introduced earlier, which argues that behavior and 
valuations of individuals relates to how socio-cultural values are mediated by institutions. As we argue 
that agents are necessarily embedded in social relations with others (Davis 2003), their valuations, 
expressed through behavior, need to be recognized, understood by others – some others will also share 
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these. From the perspective of social theory, then, it makes sense to focus not so much on individuals per 
se, but on how individuals possibly change their institutional environment.  
 
Tensions occur when individuals decide to act contrary to routinized patterns of behavior because 
(definition of) situations do not conform to aspirations and preferences, allowing valuations to diverge 
from expectations about the performance of an institutional setting and the way it has come to express 
social-cultural values. These tensions trigger changes in individual behavior and institutions. Given that 
our central concern is institutional change, we will focus on the interplay between institutions/ 
institutional settings and socio-cultural values. The Nexus of Figures 3 and 4 suggest three sources for 
institutional changes, arising from different tensions: 
 
A. Value tensions, 
B. Institution tensions, and 
C. Value-Institution tensions. 
 
 
These different forms of tensions explain institutional change and stability, we submit. It is individuals 
who perceive the tensions, who can act on them, as is apparent in this quote from the pragmatist 
philosopher John Dewey (1916, p.346, italics in original): 
 
‘Every new idea, every conception of things differing from that authorized by current belief, 
must have its origin in an individual. New ideas are doubtless always sprouting, but a society 
governed by custom does not encourage their development.  On the contrary, it tends to  
suppress them, just because they are deviations from what is current.  The man who looks at  
things differently from others is in such a community a suspect character . . .’  
 
Individuals can change institutional settings, we argue, when the tension perceived is shared, and the 
alternative institutional setting proposed is believed sufficiently justified by reference to (some of the ) 
socio-cultural values subscribed to by a community. The three tensions are, of course, ideal typical 
forms. Central to an understanding of processes of institutional change is the idea that tensions between, 
or mismatches of socio-cultural values on the one hand, and institutions on the other, is the motor of 
change.  
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  Proposition 5: A process of institutional change starts with a shared perception of any of  
  three tensions between institutions and/or the socio-cultural values they  
  are grounded in. 
 
Rather than extensively reviewing the literature on institutional change, we thus submit a proposal for 
understanding the topic that focuses on tensions between socio-cultural values and existing institutional 
settings. We will discuss these different tensions by sometimes referring to examples of institutional 
change in rock or pop music.  Pop music is a good with an important symbolic meaning for many 
people, and therefore socio-cultural values are more clearly associated with it. However, many activities 
that people engage in have symbolic meanings, including one’s work, clothing, food, political 
associations, hobbies, et cetera. 
 
Value tensions – type A 
At any given moment, socio-cultural values (V) that live in a community but had been associated with 
differing institutional settings (I) may come to clash with a different set of socio-cultural values (V’) 
that (some) members of the community believe should (also) be reflected in such a practice. This gives 
rise to value tensions of type A. Pop music alludes to highly modernist socio-cultural values such as 
novelty, speed, autonomy, independence, pleasure, success, and youth are important among those 
(Frith 1996, Dolfsma 2004). Up to the 1950s such values had not been extensively association with 
music. It appeared to an audience consuming music mainly through the radio and the music press that 
music and the way it was made available had to refer to a different set of socio-cultural values than it 
had hitherto: V and V’ came into sharp contrast. Institutional changes may then become necessary: a 
movement from I to I’. Rather than having to rely on the music that is selected by ‘experts’ (i.e., 
outsiders, not part of the peer group), there is pressure for the institution of the chart to emerge. The 
chart points to the songs and artists that are successful and therefore deserve attention. Charts seem 
objective: the audience is now allowed to autonomously, independent from older people who want to 
teach it the right taste and manners to see their own choices reflected. Hence, a process of institutional 
change started to resolve this value tension between V and V’ by forming institutions I’ that would 
reflect the modernist socio-cultural values as associated with pop music. As suggested by Bush’s 
principle of minimal dislocation, the process was gradual as parties tried to limit the (effects of the) 
changes as much as possible. Hence, a return to the V – I situation may occur too. What is more, if a 
new constellation V’- I’ comes about, elements from V or from I may be incorporated into it. 
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Figure 2: Institutional change and Type A tensions 
 
Institution tensions – type B 
Institution tensions (type B) arise when related institutions or institutional settings that builds on the 
same socio-cultural values, but in a different way (are) (suddenly) (perceived to) clash and pressure for 
institutional change emerges.  Socio-cultural values are not at issue in these circumstances. Practices 
previously perceived to be disconnected may come to be seen as related, for instance. Tensions 
emerging may only be perceived after some time has passed. A process of institutional change will 
start to the effect that tensions disappear or are abated. 
Anand and Peterson (2000) analyze changes in the institutions through which information 
about the music market in the form of charts in the US are compiled. Their analysis shows that 
institutions in the market are important for participants to make sense of the market, creating a shared 
focus of attention. They use the term “market information regime.” A change from a ‘chart position’ 
type of chart as championed for a long time by Billboard to a ‘unit sales’ one as introduced by 
Soundscape had a number of important effects for the music industry. It made comparisons across 
genres possible, it strengthened the position of the larger record labels/companies, and it created more 
possibilities for segmentation of the market. In addition, country music came to be represented 
stronger in the charts, while the charts themselves grew more volatile. It was no longer possible to 
hide behind the known shortcomings of the previous Billboard system. When an artist was successful, 
earlier she would invoke the Billboard chart to prove so; when she was not, she would point to its 
known faults. Most market information regimes thus have political overtones such as these attached to 
 
(            ?) 
V V’ 
I 
 
 
     V’ 
 
      I’ 
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them, and are subject to interpretation. Anand & Peterson (2000) describe a pure case of institutions 
tension in the US music market, as socio-cultural values associated with the institution of the chart did 
not change. Changes only relate to the different way charts were being compiled, shaking up the 
instituted information regime of this market.  In its purity as an institution tension, it is a rare case. 
 
Figure 3: Institutional change and Type B tensions 
 
Value-Institution tensions – type C 
An institutional ‘furniture’ I emerged or was set up with reference to a particular (combination of) socio-
cultural values V, but may drift away from these values (I to I’, arrow [1]). Institutions may, over time, 
come to represent different socio-cultural values (V’) than they had originally (V), they may thus be 
hollowed out, or re-valued (Böröcz 1995). A tension arises between the original socio-cultural values V 
that agents immersed in the practice as well as outsiders still refer to on the one hand, and the newly 
emerged institutional setting I’ on the other hand. Socio-cultural values change much less quickly than 
institutions do - changes in the former may take decades or even centuries to materialize (cf. Campbell 
1987, Inglehart 1990, Hofstede 1980), even when changes in the latter (usually) are not overnight as 
well, for one because institutions are interrelated. The institutional practice will thus have to change to 
align again with V (arrow 2’), or a new set of socio-cultural values V’ will have to be subscribed to 
(arrow 2’) for the particular practice.  
 
         V 
   I 
 I’
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Figure 4: Institutional change and Type C tensions 
 
Recent developments in most European health care systems present an example of the building of such 
a type C tension.  Most health care systems in countries within the European Union are build upon the 
value of solidarity: we share the costs of health care, even though there are great differences in the 
extent to which we make use of health care services at any given moment in time between individuals, 
and across time for a single individual. Health care systems across Europe are, however, very much 
under pressure for at least the following reasons: 
 
(1) The ongoing process of individualization whereby persons feel less strongly related to and  
  responsible for others in their family, class, religion, society. Being responsible for their  
  possible misfortunes themselves, these others need to fend for themselves. Reciprocal social  
  responsibilities decline, and our sense of community is diminished. A solidarity-based health  
  care system would then not be seen as legitimate. 
(2) A widening gap between expectations of and demands on the health care system on the one  
  hand, and the limited and conditional nature of its supply on the other hand. In continental  
  Europe at least, for reasons of scale economies the government has come to monopolize many  
  aspects of health care systems that are legitimized by a reference to solidarity. Governments  
  are also trusted to do so.  Demand has (sharply) increased because of the rising number of  
  elderly, consumerism from well-informed and assertive clients, growing medical knowledge  
  and technical possibilities. Due to a government that wants to control the budget for health  
 
    
      V 
 
    V’ 
 
     I 
 
             I’ 
(2’’ )
(2’ )
(1)
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  care expenditures restrictions supply of health care services has lagged behind. Informal care  
  has diminished too. The scarcity that resulted puts strains on solidarity as a principle for  
  structuring health care.  
(3) Attempts to save the solidarity-based health care system from collapse, has induced a  
  gradualist policy of downsizing and rationing. Field formerly a responsibility of the system  
  have been outsourced to the private (market) sphere or redefined as a private responsibility.  
  Moving the financial responsibility for the use of health care services to individual may be  
  needed to prevent free riding, as it provides incentives to moderate demand, but it is equally a  
  threat to solidarity as a basis for the system by addressing people as knaves thereby  
  undermining their knightly (intrinsic) motives (Le Grand 2003). 
  
As a consequence, European health care systems have moved from a solidarity based system (I) 
towards a market-oriented systems based on competition, emphasizing individual interest and 
responsibility (I’). Ostensibly, however, the socio-cultural values the system is founded in are, still 
largely those of solidarity, at least for many participants in the system and not just patients and health 
care providers (Grit & Dolfsma 2002). A shift towards an ‘American’ system (I’) with its emphasis on 
choice, freedom and accountability at some point will be perceived by individuals to have caused a 
tension of type C. Either a new ground for legitimating institutions of health care is sought (in V’), or 
the institutional setting moves back from I’ to I again. 
 
5    Individual Action & Institutional Form 
 
  “To a very large extent changes in the image comes about through the impact on society of  
  unusually creative, charismatic or prophetic individuals.” (Boulding 1956, p.75) 
 
We argue that individuals cannot escape institutions, but people do have choices and can exert their 
agency even within any given institutional furniture. Drawing on the long discussion that is often 
perceived as structure versus agency, we argue that the opposition is overemphasized by many. The 
major scholars who have focused on the theme are somewhere in the middle on the continuum rather 
than at the extremes. Arguing that a focus on the process of institutional change allow bridges to be 
build, we discuss the choices individuals may make in terms of the Social Value Nexus. This Nexus 
shows how institutions and institutional settings must be perceived as legitimate, referring to socio-
cultural values,  ways of offering order in a specific practice where some kind of order is deemed to be 
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needed. Any given institutions, perceived or defined by individuals in particular situations, may be 
changed by the behavior of individuals. We submit that such will be possible when any of three 
different tensions are perceived between socio-cultural values relevant for a practice, between 
institutional settings relevant for a practice, or between two different sets of socio-cultural values and 
related institutional settings. Such a conceptualization both indicates how agency plays a role in 
structures, and is able to help social scientists understand when and how institutional settings change. 
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Appendix A: Institutions - defined and interrelated. 
Neale (1987) claims that an institution may be said to exist when (1) there are a number of people showing (2) 
the same kind of behavior in (3) similar situations, (4) each justifying or explaining their behavior in the same 
way, an institution exists. Condition (4) points to socio-cultural values that underlie people’s behavior, and is 
thus a crucial element. Institutions concerns social phenomena, they do not concern what John Searle (1994) has 
called ‘brute facts’. Therefore, it should be possible to change the institutions. In this view, then, institutions can 
be as much enabling as they can be constraining. Enabling or constraining of social, that is non-natural or non-
biological, behavior – behavior that can be changed. The use of money is an example of an institution. An 
institutional setting is the specific combination of a number of interrelated institutions; institutions can be studied 
at different levels of analysis. A market is an example of an institutional setting, as it combines a number of 
institutions including the institution of the use of money. In a similar vein could radio programs, including charts 
and disc jockeys, broadcasting organizations and a country’s broadcasting system be looked at as institutions 
(Dolfsma 2004). An institution does not have to have an ontological status but can be ‘merely’ epistemic, a 
mental construct (Neale 1987). Institutions may thus be formal as well as informal, and give activities, 
expectations stability and repetition, making society predictable to a certain degree. Not least of all, however, the 
people involved justify or explain their behavior in similar ways, as meaning is attached to practices. 
 When individual behavior is influenced by, and dependent on the social environment consisting of institutions 
related to each other in some way, three issues become important. The first one is how the social environment 
influences people’s behavior. Socialization is one way of looking at this. A second, clearly related issue is how 
institutions are interrelated to shape what can be called a culture. The third issue is that of institutional change: 
how and why do institutions change.  
 Bush (1987, p. 1106), drawing on the same literature as Neale (1987), emphasizes “the interdependence of 
institutional structure” to the point where he argues that the dislocation of the institutional structure that a change 
causes needs to be ‘minimal’ in order to be feasible. In a similar vein, studies of the concept of culture, its 
systematic, almost organic nature is uniformly stressed (DiMaggio 1994; Eckstein 1996; Peterson 1979; 
Rockeach 1979). Changes are, consequently, more likely to be evolutionary than revolutionary. Changes in the 
institutions are not just relatively slow; their occurrence as well as their direction is in large part dependent on 
what was before. Institutional change is a path dependent process. ‘Path dependence’ does not necessarily refer 
to the development of technology (David 1985); ‘history matters’ in the social environment as well (David 1994, 
Hodgson 1999, Becker 2004). As Bush (1987, pp.1077-8) observes, emphasizing the role of institutions and 
values in understanding path dependence, “values not only correlate behavior within the behavioral pattern, they 
also correlate behavioral patterns with one another”. 
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